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In the current economic crisis, the workings of automatic stabilizers are widely seen
to play a key role in stabilizing demand and output. Automatic stabilizers are usu-
ally de￿ned as those elements of ￿scal policy which mitigate output ￿ uctuations
without discretionary government action (see, e.g., Eaton and Rosen (1980)). De-
spite the importance of automatic stabilizers for stabilizing the economy, ￿very little
work has been done on automatic stabilization [...] in the last 20 years￿ (Blan-
chard (2006)). However, especially in the current crisis, it is important to assess
the contribution of automatic stabilizers to overall ￿scal expansion and to compare
their magnitude across countries. Previous research on automatic stabilization has
mainly relied on macro data. Exceptions based on micro data are Auerbach and
Feenberg (2000) for the US and Mabbett and Schelkle (2007) for the EU-15. More
comparative work based on micro data has been conducted on the di⁄erences in the
tax wedge and e⁄ective marginal tax rates between the US and European countries
(see, e.g., Piketty and Saez (2007)).
In this paper, we combine these two strands of the literature to compare the
magnitude and composition of automatic stabilization between the US and Europe
based on micro data estimates. We analyze the impact of automatic stabilizers
using microsimulation models for 19 European countries (EUROMOD) and the US
(TAXSIM). The microsimulation approach allows us to investigate the causal e⁄ects
of di⁄erent types of shocks on household disposable income, holding everything else
constant (see Bourguignon and Spadaro (2006)). Thus we can single out the role
of automatic stabilization. This is much more di¢ cult in an ex-post evaluation (or
with macro level data) as it is not possible to disentangle the e⁄ects of automatic
stabilizers, active ￿scal and monetary policy and behavioral responses like changes
in labor supply or disability bene￿t take-up in such a framework. Our simulation
analysis therefore complements the macro literature on the relationship between gov-
ernment size and volatility (e.g., Gal￿ (1994), Fat￿s and Mihov (2001)) by providing
estimates for the size of automatic stabilizers.
We run two controlled experiments of macro shocks to income and employment.
The ￿rst is a proportional decline in household gross income by 5% (income shock).
This is the usual way of modeling aggregate shocks in simulation studies analyz-
ing automatic stabilizers. However, economic downturns typically a⁄ect households
asymmetrically, with some households losing their jobs and su⁄ering a sharp decline
1in income and other households being much less a⁄ected, as wages are usually rigid
in the short term. We therefore consider a second idiosyncratic shock where some
households become unemployed, so that the unemployment rate increases such that
total household income decreases by 5% (unemployment shock). This idiosyncratic
shock a⁄ects each household in a di⁄erent way with income losses ranging between
zero (if the household is not a⁄ected) and total household gross income (in case all
members of the household become unemployed). We show that these two types of
shocks and the resulting stabilization coe¢ cients can be interpreted as an average
e⁄ective marginal tax rate (EMTR) for the whole tax bene￿t system at the inten-
sive (proportional income shock) or extensive (unemployment shock) margin. After
identifying the e⁄ects of these shocks on disposable income, we use various methods
to estimate the prevalence of credit constraints among households. Among these is
the approach by Zeldes (1989) where ￿nancial wealth is the determinant for credit
constraints, but also alternative approaches which are based on information regard-
ing home ownership (Runkle (1991)) as well as on direct survey evidence (Jappelli
et al. (1998)). On this basis, we calculate how the stabilization of disposable income
can translate into demand stabilization.
As our measure of automatic stabilization, we extend the normalized tax change
(Auerbach and Feenberg (2000)) to include other taxes as well as social contributions
and bene￿ts. Our income stabilization coe¢ cient relates the shock absorption of
the whole tax and transfer system to the overall size of the income shock. We
take into account personal income taxes (at all government levels), social insurance
contributions and payroll taxes paid by employers and employees, value added or
sales taxes as well as transfers to private households such as unemployment bene￿ts.1
Computations are done according to the tax bene￿t rules which were in force before
2008 in order to avoid an endogeneity problem resulting from policy responses after
the start of the crisis.
What does the present paper contribute to the literature? First, previous studies
have focused on proportional income shocks whereas our analysis shows that auto-
matic stabilizers work very di⁄erently in the case of unemployment shocks, which
a⁄ect households asymmetrically.2 This is especially important for assessing the ef-
1We abstract from other taxes, in particular corporate income taxes. For an analysis of au-
tomatic stabilizers in the corporate tax system see Devereux and Fuest (2009) and Buettner and
Fuest (forthcoming).
2Auerbach and Feenberg (2000) do consider a shock where households at di⁄erent income
levels are a⁄ected di⁄erently, but the results are very similar to the case of a symmetric shock.
2fectiveness of automatic stabilizers in the current economic crisis. Second, we extend
the micro data measure on automatic stabilization to di⁄erent taxes and bene￿ts.
Our analysis includes a decomposition of the overall stabilization e⁄ects into the
contributions of taxes, social insurance contributions and bene￿ts. A further dif-
ference between our study and Auerbach and Feenberg (2000) is that we take into
account unemployment bene￿ts and state level income taxes. This explains why our
estimates of overall automatic stabilization e⁄ects in the US are higher. In two ex-
tensions, we also consider consumption taxes and employer￿ s contributions. Third,
to the best of our knowledge, our study is the ￿rst to estimate the prevalence of
liquidity constraints for such a large set of European countries based on household
data.3 This is of key importance for assessing the role of automatic stabilizers for
demand smoothing. Moreover, we use several di⁄erent strategies for estimating liq-
uidity constraints in order to explore the sensitivity of demand stabilization results.
Fourth, we extend the analysis to more recent years and countries - including tran-
sition countries from Eastern Europe - and we compare the US and Europe within
the same microeconometric framework. Finally, we shed light on the issue whether
macro indicators are a good proxy for micro data based stabilization coe¢ cients. We
also investigate whether bigger governments or more open economies have higher or
lower automatic stabilizers.
We show that our extensions to previous research are important for the com-
parison between the U.S. and Europe as they help to identify driving forces in
automatic stabilization. Our analysis leads to the following main results. In the
case of an income shock, approximately 38% of the shock would be absorbed by
automatic stabilizers in the EU. For the US, we ￿nd a value of 32%. This is surpris-
ing because automatic stabilizers in Europe are usually perceived to be drastically
higher than in the US. Our results qualify this view to some extent, at least as far
as proportional macro shocks on household income are concerned. When looking at
the personal income tax only, the values for the US are even higher than the EU
average. Within the EU, there is considerable heterogeneity, and results for overall
stabilization of disposable income range from a value of 25% for Estonia to 56%
for Denmark. In general, automatic stabilizers in Eastern and Southern European
Our analysis con￿rms this for the US, but not for Europe.
3There are several studies on liquidity constraints and the responsiveness of households to tax
changes for the US (see, e.g., Zeldes (1989), Parker (1999), Souleles (1999), Johnson et al. (2006),
Shapiro and Slemrod (1995, 2003, 2009))
3countries are considerably lower than in Continental and Northern European coun-
tries. In the case of the idiosyncratic unemployment shock, the di⁄erence between
the EU and the US is larger. EU automatic stabilizers absorb 47% of the shock
whereas the stabilization e⁄ect in the US is only 34%. Again, there is considerable
heterogeneity within the EU.
How does this cushioning of shocks translate into demand stabilization? If de-
mand stabilization can only be achieved for liquidity constrained households, the
picture changes signi￿cantly. Here, the results are sensitive with respect to the
method used for estimating liquidity constraints. For the income shock, the cush-
ioning e⁄ect of automatic stabilizers is now in the range of 4-22% in the EU and
between 6-17% in the US. For the unemployment shock, however, we ￿nd a larger
di⁄erence. In the EU, the stabilization e⁄ect substantially exceeds the comparable
US value for all liquidity constraint estimation methods. It ranges from 13-30%
whereas results for the US are between 7-20% and are similar to the values for the
income shock. These results suggest that social transfers, in particular the rather
generous systems of unemployment insurance in Europe, play a key role for demand
stabilization and explain an important part of the di⁄erence in automatic stabilizers
between Europe and the US.
A ￿nal issue we discuss in the paper is how ￿scal stimulus programs of individual
countries are related to automatic stabilizers. In particular, we ask whether countries
with low automatic stabilizers have tried to compensate this by larger ￿scal stimuli,
but we ￿nd no correlation between the size of ￿scal stimulus programs and automatic
stabilizers. However, we do ￿nd that discretionary ￿scal policy programmes have
been smaller in more open economies.
The paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we provide a short overview
of previous research with respect to automatic stabilization and comparisons of US
and European tax bene￿t systems. In addition, we discuss how stabilization e⁄ects
can be measured. Section 3 describes the microsimulation models EUROMOD and
TAXSIM and the di⁄erent macro shock scenarios we consider. Section 4 presents
the results on automatic stabilization which are discussed in Section 5 together with
potential limitations of our approach. Section 6 concludes.
42 Previous research and theoretical framework
2.1 Previous research
There are two strands of literature which are related to our paper. The ￿rst is the
literature on the analysis and measurement of automatic ￿scal stabilizers. In the
empirical literature4, two types of studies prevail: macro data studies and micro
data approaches.5 The common baseline of macro data studies is to measure the
cyclical elasticitiy of di⁄erent budget components such as the income tax, social
security contributions, the corporate tax, indirect taxes or unemployment bene￿ts.
Di⁄erent approaches have been proposed, for example regressing changes in ￿scal
variables on the growth rate of GDP or estimating elasticities on the basis of macro-
econometric models.6 Sachs and Sala-i Martin (1992) and Bayoumi and Masson
(1995) use time series data and ￿nd values of 30%-40% for disposable income stabi-
lization in the US. However, these approaches raise several issues, in particular the
challenge of separating discretionary actions from automatic stabilizers in combina-
tion with identi￿cation problems resulting from endogenous regressors. Related to
the literature on macro estimations of automatic stabilization are studies that focus
on the relationship between output volatility, public sector size and openness of the
economy (Cameron (1978), Gal￿ (1994), Rodrik (1998), Fat￿s and Mihov (2001),
Auerbach and Hassett (2002)).
Much less work has been done on the measurement of automatic stabilizers
with micro data. Auerbach and Feenberg (2000) use the NBER￿ s microsimulation
model TAXSIM to estimate the automatic stabilization for the US from 1962-95
4A theoretical analysis of automatic stabilizers in a real business cycle (RBC) model can be
found in Gal￿ (1994). One issue of standard RBC models is that they are not able to explain
the stylized fact that the size of government (as a proxy for automatic stabilizers) is negatively
correlated with the volatility of business cycles. In fact, under some reasonable assumptions, a
standard RBC model produces a positive correlation (AndrØs et al. (2008)). In addition, such
models are not able to explain evidence that consumption responds positively to increases in
government spending (Blanchard and Perotti (2002), Fat￿s and Mihov (2002) or Perotti (2002)).
These facts, however, can be easily explained by a simple textbook IS-LM model as well as by
large-scale macroeconometric models (van den Noord (2000), Buti and van den Noord (2004)).
Gal￿ et al. (2007) and AndrØs et al. (2008) show that both facts can only be explained in a RBC
model by adding Keynesian features like nominal and real rigidities in combination with rule-of-
thumb consumers to the analysis.
5Early estimates on the responsiveness of the tax system to income ￿ uctuations are discussed
in the Appendix of Goode (1976). More recent contributions include Fat￿s and Mihov (2001),
Blanchard and Perotti (2002), MØlitz and Zumer (2002).
6Cf. van den Noord (2000) or Girouard and AndrØ (2005).
5and ￿nd values for the stabilization of disposable income ranging between 25%-35%.
Auerbach (2009) has updated this analysis and ￿nds a value of around 25% for more
recent years. Mabbett and Schelkle (2007) conduct a similar analysis for 15 Western
European countries in 1998 and ￿nd higher stabilization e⁄ects than in the US, with
results ranging from 32%-58%.7 How does this smoothing of disposable income a⁄ect
household demand? To the best of our knowledge, Auerbach and Feenberg (2000)
is the only simulation study which estimates the demand e⁄ect taking into account
liquidity constraints. They use the method suggested by Zeldes (1989) and ￿nd
that approximately two thirds of all households are likely to be liquidity constrained.
Given this, the contribution of automatic stabilizers to demand smoothing is reduced
to approximately 15% of the initial income shock.
The second strand of related literature focuses on international comparisons of
income tax systems in terms of e⁄ective average and marginal tax rates, and in-
dividual tax wedges between the US and European countries. This literature has
mainly relied on micro data and the simulation approach in order to take into ac-
count the heterogeneity of the population. Piketty and Saez (2007) use a large
public micro-￿le tax return data set for the US to compute average tax rates for ￿ve
federal taxes and di⁄erent income groups. They complement the analysis for the
US with a comparison to France and the UK. A key ￿nding from their analysis is
that today (and in contrast to 1970), France, a typical continental European welfare
state, has higher average tax rates than the two Anglo-Saxon countries. The French
tax system is also more progressive. Immvervoll (2004) discusses conceptual issues
with regard to macro- and micro-based measures of the tax burden and compares
e⁄ective tax rates in fourteen EU Member States. In general, he ￿nds a large hetero-
geneity across countries with average and marginal e⁄ective tax rates being lowest
in southern European countries. Other studies take as given that European tax
systems reveal a higher degree of progressivity (e.g. Alesina and Glaeser (2004)) or
higher (marginal) tax rates in general (e.g. Prescott (2004) or Alesina et al. (2005))
and discuss to what extent di⁄erences in economic outcomes such as hours worked
can be explained by di⁄erent tax structures. By providing new measures of the aver-
age e⁄ective marginal tax rate (EMTR) both at the intensive and extensive margin
7Mabbett and Schelkle (2007) rely for their analysis (which is a more recent version of Mabbett
(2004)) on the results from an in￿ ation scenario taken from Immvervoll et al. (2006) who use the
microsimulation model EUROMOD to increase earnings by 10% in order to simulate the sensitivity
of poverty indicators with respect to macro level changes.
6for the US and 19 European countries, this paper sheds further light on existing
di⁄erences between the US and European tax and transfer systems.
2.2 Theoretical framework
The extent to which automatic stabilizers mitigate the impact of income shocks on
household demand essentially depends on two factors. First, the tax and transfer
system determines the way in which a given shock to gross income translates into a
change in disposable income. For instance, in the presence of a proportional income
tax with a tax rate of 40%, a shock on gross income of one hundred Euros leads
to a decline in disposable income of 60 Euros. In this case, the tax absorbs 40%
of the shock to gross income. A progressive tax, in turn, would have a stronger
stabilizing e⁄ect. The second factor is the link between current disposable income
and current demand for goods and services. If the income shock is perceived as
transitory and current demand depends on some concept of permanent income, and
if households can borrow or use accumulated savings, their demand will not change.
In this case, the impact of automatic stabilizers on current demand would be equal
to zero. Things are di⁄erent, though, if some households are liquidity constrained
or acting as ￿rule-of-thumb￿ consumers (Campbell and Mankiw (1989)). In this
case, their current expenditures do depend on disposable income so that automatic
stabilizers play a role.
A common measure for estimating automatic stabilization is the ￿normalized tax
change￿used by Auerbach and Feenberg (2000) which can be interpreted as ￿the
tax system￿ s built-in ￿exibility￿(Pechman (1973, 1987)). It shows how changes in
market income translate into changes in disposable income through changes in per-
sonal income tax payments. We extend the concept of normalized tax change to
include other taxes as well as social insurance contributions and transfers like e.g.
unemployment bene￿ts. We take into account personal income taxes (at all govern-
ment levels), social insurance contributions as well as payroll taxes and transfers to
private households such as unemployment bene￿ts.
Market income Y M




i = Ei + Qi + Ii + Pi + Oi (1)
where Ei is labour income, Qi business income, Ii capital income, Pi property in-
7come, and Oi other income. Disposable income Y D
i is de￿ned as market income





i ￿ Gi = Y
M
i ￿ (Ti + Si ￿ Bi) (2)
where Ti are direct taxes, Si employee social insurance contributions, and Bi are
social cash bene￿ts (i.e. negative taxes). Note that an extended analysis includ-
ing employer social insurance contributions and consumption taxes is presented in
Section 4.4.
We analyze the impact of automatic stabilizers in two steps. The ￿rst is the
stabilization of disposable income and the second is the stabilization of demand.
Consider ￿rst the stabilization of disposable income. Throughout the rest of the
paper, we refer to our measure of this e⁄ect as the income stabilization coe¢ cient






The derivation can be either done at the macro or at the micro level. On the
macro level, the aggregate change in market income (￿Y M) is transmitted via ￿I
into an aggregate change in disposable income (￿Y D):
￿Y
D = (1 ￿ ￿)￿Y
M (4)
However, one issue when computing ￿I based on the change of macro level aggr-
gates is that macro data changes include behavioral and general equilibrium e⁄ects
as well as discretionary policy measures. Therefore, a measure of automatic sta-
bilization based on macro data changes captures all these e⁄ects. Thus, it is not
possible to disentangle the automatic stabilization from stabilization through dis-
cretionary policies or changes in behavior because of endogeneity and identi￿cation
problems. That is why in these studies the correlation between government size
and output volatility is analyzed as a proxy for automatic stabilization. To com-
plement this literature and in order to isolate the impact of automatic stabilization




i ) and market income (
P
i ￿Y M
i ) based on micro data information
taken from a microsimulation tax-bene￿t calculator, which - by de￿nition - avoids





































where ￿I measures the sensitivity of disposable income, Y D
i ; with respect to market
income, Y M
i . The higher ￿I, the stronger the stabilization e⁄ect. For example,.
￿I = 0:4 implies that 40% of the income shock is absorbed by the tax bene￿t
system. Note that the income stabilization coe¢ cient is not only determined by the
size of government (e.g. measured as expenditure or revenue in percent of GDP)
but also depends on the structure of the tax bene￿t system and the design of the
di⁄erent components.
The de￿nition of ￿I resembles that of an average e⁄ective marginal tax rate
(EMTR), which is usually computed in this way using micro data (Immvervoll
(2004)). In the case of the proportional income shock, ￿I can be interpreted as
the EMTR along the intensive margin, whereas in the case of the unemployment
shock, it resembles the EMTR along the extensive margin (participation tax rate,
see, e.g., Saez (2001, 2002), Kleven and Kreiner (2006) or Immervoll et al. (2007)).
Another advantage of the micro data based approach is that it enables us to ex-
plore the extent to which di⁄erent individual components of the tax transfer system
contribute to automatic stabilization. Comparing tax bene￿t systems in Europe
and the US, we are interested in the weight of each component in the respective
country. We therefore decompose the coe¢ cient into its components which include



































Consider next the second step of the analysis, the impact on demand. In order to
8Note that a potential drawback of this approach is that we neglect general equilibrium e⁄ects
as well as behavioral adjustments as a response to an income shock. This, however, is done on
purpose, as we do not aim at quantifying the overall adjustment to a shock but to single out the
size of automatic stabilizers, which - by de￿nition - automatically smooth incomes without taking
into account the e⁄ects of discretionary policy action or behavioral responses.
9stabilize ￿nal demand and output, the cushioning e⁄ect on disposable income has to
be transmitted to expenditures for goods and services. If current demand depends
on some concept of permanent income, demand will not change in response to a
transitory income shock. Things are di⁄erent, though, if households are liquidity
constrained and cannot borrow. In this case, their current expenditures do depend
on disposable income so that automatic stabilizers play a role. Following Auerbach
and Feenberg (2000), we assume that households who face liquidity constraints fully
adjust consumption expenditure after changes in disposable income while no such
behavior occurs among households without liquidity constraints.9 The adjustment of
liquidity constrained households is such that changes in disposable income are equal
to changes in consumption. Hence, the coe¢ cient which measures stabilization of
aggregate demand becomes:
￿










i denotes the consumption response of liquidity constrained households.
In the following, we refer to ￿C as the demand stabilization coe¢ cient.
In the literature on the estimation of the prevalence of liquidity constraints,
several approaches have been used. Recent surveys of the di⁄erent methods show
that there is no perfect approach since each approach has its own drawbacks (see
Jappelli et al. (1998) and Jappelli and Pistaferri (forthcoming)). Therefore, in order
to explore the sensitivity of our estimates of the demand stabilization coe¢ cient
with respect to the way in which liquidity constrained households are identi￿ed,
we choose three di⁄erent approaches. In the ￿rst one, we use the same approach
as Auerbach and Feenberg (2000) and follow Zeldes (1989) to split the samples
according to a speci￿c wealth to income ratio. A household is liquidity constrained
if the household￿ s net ￿nancial wealth Wi (derived from capitalized asset incomes)











9Note that the term ￿liquidity constraint￿ does not have to be interpreted in an absolute
inability to borrow but can also come in a milder form of a substantial di⁄erence between borrowing
and lending rates which can result in distortions of the timing of purchases. Note further that our
demand stabilization coe¢ cient does not predict the overall change of ￿nal demand, but the extent
to which demand of liquidity constrained households is stabilized by the tax bene￿t system.
10The second approach makes use of information regarding homeowners in the
data and classi￿es those households as liquidity constrained who do not own their
home (see, e.g. Runkle (1991)).10 However, common points of criticism on sample
splitting techniques based on wealth are that wealth is a good predictor of liquidity
constraints only if the relation between the two is approximately monotonic and that
assets and asset incomes are often poorly measured (see, e.g. Jappelli et al. (1998)).
Therefore, in a third approach we use direct information from household surveys
for the identi￿cation of liquidity constrained household (Jappelli et al. (1998)). Our
data for the US, the Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF), contains questions about
credit applications which have been either rejected, not fully approved or which have
not been submitted because of the fear of rejection. In the third approach, we classify
all US households as liquidity constrained who answer one of the questions above
with ￿yes￿ . As no comparable information is available in our data for European
countries, we rely on EU SILC data and conduct a logit estimation with the binary
variable ￿capacity to face unexpected ￿nancial expenses￿as dependent variable. In
a next step, making an out-of-sample prediction11, we are able to detect liquidity
constrained households in our data for the European countries.12
A recent survey of the vast literature on consumption responses to income
changes can be found in Jappelli and Pistaferri (forthcoming). A key ￿nding from
this literature is that the heterogeneity of households has to be taken into account
in the analysis of consumption responses since liquidity constraints of population
subgroups can explain di⁄erent consumption responses. We are aware that the ap-
proaches we have taken to account for such constraints can only be approximations
for real household behavior in the event of income shocks. They provide a range
for demand stabilization due to automatic stabilization. The ￿rst approach is likely
10When modifying this approach such that in addition to non-homeowners also households with
outstanding mortgage payments on their homes are classi￿ed as liquidity constrained, the results
change and are much closer to the Zeldes criterion.
11Results of these estimations are available from the authors upon request.
12To check the robustness of the third approach and to make sure that the estimation of liquidity
constraints based on survey evidence is comparable between the US and the EU, we make two
extensions. First, we employ a similar question in the SCF as used in the EU SILC data (￿in an
emergency, could you get ￿nancial assistance of $3000 or more (...)?￿ ). Using this question for
the US, we ￿nd exactly the same amount of demand stabilization as obtained with the questions
about credit applications. Second, we make a further robustness check for the EU SILC data and
exploit information about arrears on mortgage payments, utility bills and hire purchase instalments
yielding similar shares of liquidity constrained households and thus similar stabilization results.
These two extensions support our view that the estimations based on survey evidence are robust
and, at least to some extent, comparable between the US and the EU.
11to give an upper bound since the provision of government insurance reduces incen-
tives to engage in precautionary savings and holdings of liquid assets. Conversely,
estimates based on the third approach, i.e. identi￿cation of liquidity constrained
households through direct survey evidence, are likely to give a lower bound given
estimates found in the literature (cf. Jappelli et al. (1998)).
3 Data and methodology
3.1 Microsimulation using TAXSIM and EUROMOD
We use microsimulation techniques to simulate taxes, bene￿ts and disposable in-
come under di⁄erent scenarios for a representative micro-data sample of households.
Simulation analysis allows conducting a controlled experiment by changing the pa-
rameters of interest while holding everything else constant (cf. Bourguignon and
Spadaro (2006)). We therefore do not have to deal with endogeneity problems when
identifying the e⁄ects of the policy reform under consideration.
Simulations are carried out using TAXSIM - the NBER￿ s microsimulation model
for calculating liabilities under US Federal and State income tax laws from individual
data - and EUROMOD, a static tax-bene￿t model for 19 EU countries, which was
designed for comparative analysis.13 The models can simulate most direct taxes and
bene￿ts except those based on previous contributions as this information is usually
not available from the cross-sectional survey data used as input datasets. Informa-
tion on these instruments is taken directly from the original data sources. Both
models assume full bene￿t take-up and tax compliance, focusing on the intended
e⁄ects of tax-bene￿t systems. The main stages of the simulations are the following.
First, a micro-data sample and tax-bene￿t rules are read into the model. Then for
each tax and bene￿t instrument, the model constructs corresponding assessment
units, ascertains which are eligible for that instrument and determines the amount
of bene￿t or tax liability for each member of the unit. Finally, after all taxes and
13For more information on TAXSIM see Feenberg and Coutts (1993) or visit
http://www.nber.org/taxsim/. For further information on EUROMOD see Sutherland
(2001, 2007). There are also country reports available with detailed information
on the input data, the modeling and validation of each tax bene￿t system, see
http://www.iser.essex.ac.uk/research/euromod. The tax-bene￿t systems included in the model
have been validated against aggregated administrative statistics as well as national tax-bene￿t
models (where available), and the robustness checked through numerous applications (see, e.g.,
Bargain (2006)).
12bene￿ts in question are simulated, disposable income is calculated.
3.2 Scenarios
The existing literature on stabilization so far has concentrated on increases in earn-
ings or gross incomes to examine the stabilizing impact of tax bene￿t systems. In
the light of the current economic crisis, there is much more interest in a downturn
scenario. Reinhart and Rogo⁄ (2009) stress that recessions which follow a ￿nancial
crisis have particularly severe e⁄ects on asset prices, output and unemployment.
Therefore, we are interested not only in a scenario of a uniform decrease in incomes
but also in an increase of the unemployment rate. We compare a scenario where
gross incomes are proportionally decreased by 5% for all households (income shock)
to an idiosyncratic shock where some households are made unemployed and there-
fore lose all their labor earnings (unemployment shock). In the latter scenario, the
unemployment rate increases such that total household income decreases by 5% as
well in order to make both scenarios as comparable as possible.14
Our scenarios can be seen as a conservative estimate of the expected impact
of the current crisis (see Reinhart and Rogo⁄ (2009) for e⁄ects of previous crises).
The (qualitative) results are robust with respect to di⁄erent sizes of the shocks.
The results for the unemployment shock do not change much when we model it as
an increase of the unemployment rate by 5 percentage points for each country. It
would be further possible to derive more complicated scenarios with di⁄erent shocks
on di⁄erent income sources or a combination of income and unemployment shock.
However, this would only have an impact on the distribution of changes which are
not relevant in the analysis of this paper. Therefore, we focus on these two simple
scenarios in order to make our analysis as simple as possible.
The increase of the unemployment rate is modeled through reweighting of our
samples.15 The weights of the unemployed are increased while those of the employed
14One should note, though, that our analysis is not a forecasting exercise. We do not aim at
quantifying the exact e⁄ects of the current economic crisis but of stylized scenarios in order to
explore the build-in automatic stabilizers of existing pre-crisis tax-bene￿t systems. Conducting
an ex-post analysis would include discretionary government reactions and behavioral responses
(see, e.g., Aaberge et al. (2000) for an empirical ex-post analysis of a previous crisis in the Nordic
countries) and we would not be able to identify the role of automatic stabilization.
15For the reweighting procedure, we follow the approach of Immvervoll et al. (2006), who have
also simulated an increase in unemployment through reweighting of the sample. Their analysis
focuses on changes in absolute and relative poverty rates after changes in the income distribution
and the employment rate.
13with similar characteristics are decreased, i.e., in e⁄ect, a fraction of employed house-
holds is made unemployed. With this reweighting approach we control for several
individual and household characteristics that determine the risk of becoming unem-
ployed (see Appendix A.2). The implicit assumption behind this approach is that
the socio-demographic characteristics of the unemployed remain constant.16
4 Results
4.1 US vs. Europe
We start our analysis by comparing the US to Europe. Our simulation model in-
cludes 19 European countries which we treat as one single country (i.e. the ￿United
States of Europe￿ ). All of them are EU member states, which is why we refer to this
group as the EU, bearing in mind that some EU member countries are missing. We
also consider the countries of the Euro area and refer to this group as ￿ Euro￿ . Figure
1 summarizes the results of our baseline simulation, which focuses on the income
tax, social insurance contributions (or payroll taxes) paid by employees and bene￿ts.
Consider ￿rst the proportional income shock. Approximately 38% of such a shock
would be absorbed by automatic stabilizers in the EU (and Euroland). For the US,
we ￿nd a slightly lower value of 32%. This di⁄erence of just six percentage points is
surprising in so far as automatic stabilizers in Europe are usually considered to be
drastically higher than in the US.17 Our results qualify this view to a certain degree,
at least as far as proportional income shocks are concerned. Figure 1 shows that
taxes and social insurance contributions are the dominating factors which drive ￿ in
case of a uniform income shock. Bene￿ts are of minor importance in this scenario.
In the case of the idiosyncratic unemployment shock, the di⁄erence between the
EU and the US is larger. EU automatic stabilizers now absorb 47% of the shock
(49% in the Euro zone) whereas the stabilization e⁄ect in the US is only 34%. This
16Cf. Deville and S￿rndal (1992) and DiNardo et al. (1996). This approach is equivalent to
estimating probabilities of becoming unemployed (see, e.g., Bell and Blanch￿ ower (2009)) and then
selecting the individuals with the highest probabilities when controlling for the same characteristics
in the reweighting estimation (see Herault (2009)). The reweighting procedure is to some extent
sensitive to changes in control variables. However, this mainly a⁄ects the distribution of the shock
(which we do not analyze) and not the overall or mean e⁄ects which are important for the analysis
in this paper.
17Note that for the US the value of the stabilization coe¢ cient for the federal income tax only
is below 25% which is in line with the results of Auerbach and Feenberg (2000).
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di⁄erence can be explained with the importance of unemployment bene￿ts which
account for a large part of stabilization in Europe in this scenario.18 Table 3 in the
Appendix shows that bene￿ts alone absorb 19% of the shock in Europe compared
to just 7% in the US.
4.2 Country decomposition
The results for the stabilization coe¢ cient vary considerably across countries, as
can be seen from Figure 2 (and Tables 2 and 3 in the Appendix). In the case of
the income shock, we ￿nd the highest stabilization coe¢ cient for Denmark, where
18Note that in our baseline analysis we do not account for the the Extended Bene￿ts (EB)
program in the U.S. because it does not kick in automatically in all states. The EB program
provides an additional 13 to 20 weeks of unemployment bene￿ts to workers receiving unemployment
insurance in states that meet certain thresholds in terms of their unemployment rates. This
increased duration of unemployment bene￿ts slightly increases the stabilization coe¢ cient for the
U.S. and, thus, reduces the di⁄erence to the EU.
15automatic stabilizers cushion 56% of the shock. Belgium (53%), Germany (48%)
and, surprisingly, Hungary (48%) also have strong automatic stabilizers. The lowest
values are found for Estonia (25%), Spain (28%) and Greece (29%). With the
exception of France, taxes seem to have a stronger stabilizing role than social security
contributions.




































































































Source: Own calculations based on EUROMOD and TAXSIM
In case of the asymmetric unemployment shock, the stabilization coe¢ cients are
larger for the majority of countries. Again, the highest value emerges for Denmark
(82%), followed by Sweden (68%), Germany (62%) Belgium (61%) and Luxembourg
(59%). The relatively low value of stabilization from (unemployment) bene￿ts in
Finland compared to its neighboring Nordic countries might be surprising at a ￿rst
glance but can be explained with the fact that Finland has the least generous un-
employment bene￿ts of the Nordic countries (see Aaberge et al. (2000)). Hungary
(47%) is now at the EU average due to the relatively low level of unemployment
16bene￿ts. At the other end of the spectrum, there are some countries with values
below the US level of 34%. These include Estonia (23%), Italy (31%), and, to a
lesser extent, Poland (33%).
When looking only at the personal income tax, it is surprising that the values
for the US (federal and state level income tax combined) are higher than the EU
average. To some extent, this quali￿es the widespread view that tax progressivity is
higher in Europe (e.g., Alesina and Glaeser (2004) or Piketty and Saez (2007)). Of
course, this can be partly explained by the considerable heterogeneity within Europe.
But still, only a few countries like Belgium, Germany and the Nordic countries have
higher contributions of stabilization coming from the personal income tax.
An interesting question is to what extent the results for the stabilization coef-
￿cient are driven by the existing tax and transfer systems or by the demographic
characteristics in each country. To investigate this issue, we recalculate the income
stabilization coe¢ cients for each country under the given tax and transfer system,
but with the socio-demographic characteristics of each other country in our analysis.
This analysis yields a 20*20 matrix where the respective tax and transfer systems
are given in the columns and the demographics of each country in the rows. As
can be seen in Table 7, the income stabilization coe¢ cients computed under a ￿xed
tax and transfer system but with varying characteristics of the population do not
vary much. There is much more variation within a certain row (showing the income
stabilization coe¢ cients calculated with demographic characteristics of a certain
country but varying tax and transfer systems) than within a certain column (￿xed
tax and transfer system of a certain country, but varying population characteris-
tics). Interestingly, the income stabilization coe¢ cient for the US is highest with
the socio-demographic characteristics of the US population whereas income stabi-
lization is (almost) lowest in countries such Italy, Portugal, Slovenia or the UK with
their given population characteristics.19 Thus, we conclude that the tax and trans-
fer rules and not the demographic characteristics are the main determinants of the
income stabilization coe¢ cient.
4.3 Demand stabilization
How does this cushioning of shocks translate into demand stabilization? The results
for stabilization of aggregate demand in the EU and the US are shown in Table
19We obtain similar results for the unemployment shock and the demand stabilization coe¢ cient.
171 and Figure 3.20 The demand stabilization coe¢ cients are lower than the income
stabilization coe¢ cients since demand stabilization can only be achieved for liquidity
constrained households. Moreover, there is considerable variation for the demand
stabilization coe¢ cient depending on the respective approach for the identi￿cation
of liquidity constrained households. For the income shock (IS), results range from
4-22% for the EU and from 6-17% for the US. Taking the Zeldes criterion, i.e. net
wealth (based on asset income), as the determinant for liquidity constraints, demand
stabilization is 22% in the EU and 17% in the US. Demand stabilization coe¢ cients
which are based on direct survey evidence with respect to liquidity constraints on
average give the lower bound whereas those based on home ownership information
usually lie in between. For the unemployment shock (US), the EU-US gap widens
again. While in the US demand stabilization coe¢ cients mostly remain on their level
of the income shock, they are now substantially higher for the EU-group reaching
a peak of 30%. These results suggest that the transfers to the unemployed, in
particular the rather generous systems of unemployment insurance in Europe, play
a key role for demand stabilization and drive the di⁄erence in automatic stabilizers
between Europe and the US.
For a more in-depth analysis taking into account country-speci￿c results, it is use-
ful to consider ￿rst the shares of liquidity constrained households for each approach
as depicted in Table 4 in the Appendix. The Zeldes approach would suggest that
households are more likely to be liquidity constrained in Eastern than in Western
European countries because ￿nancial wealth is typically lower in the new member
states. Our estimates con￿rm this as can be seen in Table 4.21 For this reason, auto-
matic stabilizers will be more important for demand stabilization in these countries,
at least if the Zeldes criterion is used for the identi￿cation of liquidity constrained
households. A di⁄erent picture emerges if home ownership is the determinant for
liquidity constraints. It is remarkable that the share of households who own their
homes is relatively high in Eastern and Southern European countries. This suggests
a lower share of liquidity constrained households and thus a lower contribution of
20Note that in Tables 1 and 4 as well as in Figure 3, the ￿rst approach for the identi￿cation of
liquidity constraints refers to the ￿nancial wealth criterion (Zeldes), the second to the real estate
property criterion (Runkle) and the third refers to survey evidence.
21As, according to the Zeldes criterion, liquidity constrained households are those households
with low ￿nancial wealth and thus typically low income, one can expect that their share of income
(IShare1) is lower than their share in the total population. In our data, this is true for all countries
(see Table 4).







3 US ￿IIS ￿IUS
AT 0.363 0.170 0.036 0.497 0.271 0.138 0.439 0.585
BE 0.345 0.097 0.021 0.442 0.184 0.105 0.527 0.612
DK 0.285 0.135 0.020 0.592 0.257 0.230 0.558 0.823
EE 0.242 0.030 0.008 0.225 0.029 0.063 0.253 0.233
FI 0.248 0.097 0.033 0.352 0.191 0.119 0.396 0.519
FR 0.115 0.146 0.048 0.259 0.304 0.164 0.370 0.568
GE 0.143 0.246 0.080 0.253 0.380 0.235 0.481 0.624
GR 0.230 0.078 0.007 0.263 0.087 0.027 0.291 0.322
HU 0.455 0.035 0.121 0.448 0.035 0.185 0.476 0.467
IR 0.186 0.037 0.034 0.243 0.083 0.132 0.363 0.387
IT 0.283 0.068 0.019 0.233 0.057 0.033 0.346 0.311
LU 0.256 0.115 0.025 0.440 0.149 0.098 0.374 0.593
NL 0.227 0.094 0.025 0.288 0.170 0.119 0.397 0.452
PL 0.296 0.144 0.056 0.324 0.164 0.097 0.301 0.329
PT 0.240 0.073 0.007 0.313 0.140 0.008 0.303 0.386
SI 0.090 0.021 0.030 0.227 0.036 0.083 0.317 0.431
SP 0.183 0.039 0.014 0.264 0.060 0.057 0.277 0.376
SW 0.201 0.318 0.028 0.409 0.544 0.159 0.420 0.678
UK 0.263 0.063 0.024 0.349 0.186 0.164 0.352 0.415
EU 0.221 0.124 0.041 0.297 0.207 0.132 0.378 0.469
EURO 0.195 0.131 0.040 0.270 0.212 0.126 0.385 0.485
USA 0.174 0.058 0.056 0.197 0.111 0.073 0.322 0.337
Source: Own calculations based on EUROMOD and TAXSIM. Notes: ￿C: demand
stabilization coe¢ cient, ￿I : income stabilization coe¢ cient, IS: income shock, US:
unemployment shock. The ￿rst approach for the identi￿cation of liquidity constraints
refers to the ￿nancial wealth criterion (Zeldes), the second to the real estate property
criterion (Runkle) and the third refers to survey evidence.
automatic stabilizers to demand stabilization.
Finally, focusing on results for individual EU countries, there is large heterogene-
ity in demand stabilization across countries and, at least for some countries, across
the di⁄erent approaches for the identi￿cation of liquidity constraints. If ￿nancial
wealth is the determinant for liquidity constraints, demand stabilization is highest
in Hungary (46%) and the stabilization e⁄ect is above the EU average for Poland
(30%) and Estonia (24%), although disposable income stabilization is below the EU
average in these two countries. Relatively low values for automatic stabilization
e⁄ects of the tax and transfer systems on demand are found in countries where
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households are relatively wealthy, so that liquidity constraints are less important.
These include Sweden, with a stabilization coe¢ cient of 20%, and in particular Ger-
many (14%) and France (11%). However, as indicated by the relatively low share
of liquidity constrained households in Eastern and Southern European countries ac-
cording to the homeowner approach, automatic stabilization of demand is weaker in
these countries if this approach is employed. In this case, automatic stabilization of
demand is below the EU average in all countries of Eastern and Southern Europe,
whereas demand stabilization in countries such as Denmark, Germany or Sweden is
above the EU average.22
22Note that this holds for both the income shock as well as for the unemployment shock.
204.4 Extensions: Employer social insurance contributions and
consumption taxes
One limitation of our analysis is that we neglect various taxes which are certainly
relevant as automatic stabilizers and which di⁄er in their relevance across countries.
In this section, we extend our analysis to employer social insurance contributions and
consumption taxes, which include value added, excise and sales taxes. We did not
include these taxes in our baseline simulations because they raise speci￿c conceptual
issues.
4.4.1 Employer contributions
Consider ￿rst the case of employer social insurance contributions (or payroll taxes).
Including them requires us to make an assumption on their incidence. So far, we have
assumed that all taxes and transfers are borne by employees, so that a smoothing of
shocks through the tax and transfer system actually bene￿ts the employees. We will
make the same assumption for employer social insurance contributions. This implies
that, in a hypothetical situation without taxes, social insurance contributions and










i is gross income, Y M
i market income and SER
i employer social insurance
contributions. We now consider a shock to gross income and ask which part of
this shock is absorbed by the tax and transfer system. The income stabilization


















How does the inclusion of employer social insurance contributions a⁄ect the
stabilization e⁄ects? For the EU, the income stabilization coe¢ cient is now equal
to 48% for the income shock and 56% for the unemployment shock. For the US, we
￿nd respective values of 36% for the income shock and 39% for the unemployment
shock. The results by country are given in Table 5 in the Appendix.23 In countries
23Note that, when comparing these results to those of our baseline simulation, it has to be taken
21such as Italy or Sweden, employer social insurance contributions make up a large
proportion of total contributions leading to a substantial increase in stabilization
through SIC in these countries. However, the results cannot be compared directly
to those of the preceding section because the stabilization e⁄ect is now measured in
per cent of a shock to Y G
i , not Y M
i .
4.4.2 Consumption taxes
How can consumption taxes be integrated into this framework? In order to make
the results comparable to our baseline simulations, we return to the case where we
exclude employer social insurance contributions from the analysis. The data we
use includes no information on consumption expenditures of households, so that
the consumption taxes actually paid cannot be calculated directly. Instead, we use
implicit tax rates (ITR) on consumption taken from European Commission (2009b)
for European countries and McIntyre et al. (2003) for the US. The ITR is a measure
for the e⁄ective tax burden which includes several consumption taxes such as VAT or
sales taxes, energy and other excise taxes. This implicit tax rate relates consumption
taxes paid to overall consumption. Given this, we can write the budget constraint
of household i as
Y
M
i = Ci(1 + t
C) + Ai + Ti + Si ￿ Bi
where tC is the implicit consumption tax rate, T C = tCC the consumption tax
payments, and Ai represents savings.
What is the role of the consumption tax for automatic stabilization? This de-
pends on the reaction of consumption to the income shock. Our analysis assumes
that only liquidity constrained households will adjust their consumption to an in-
come shock. An automatic stabilization e⁄ect of consumption taxes can only occur
for these households, where changes in disposable income are equal to changes in
consumption and, hence, consumption tax payments. Given this, we focus on de-
mand, rather than income stabilization through the consumption tax. The demand













into account that we now consider a shock on Y G
i , not on Y M
i . This explains, for instance, why
the measured stabilization coe¢ cient of income taxes is now lower.
22where h is the index for the liquidity constrained households.
The results are given in Table 6 in the Appendix: Demand stabilization through
the consumption tax (according to the ￿nancial wealth criterion) is higher in the EU
than in the US. Within the EU, we ￿nd highest stabilization coe¢ cients in Eastern
European countries which can again be explained by the high proportion of liquidity
constrained households and a relatively higher share of direct taxes.
5 Discussion of the results
In this section, we discuss a number of possible objections to and questions raised
by our analysis. These include the relation of our results to widely used macro
indicators of automatic stabilizers, the role of other taxes, the correlation between
automatic stabilizers and other macro variables like e.g. openness and, ￿nally, the
correlations between discretionary ￿scal stimulus programs and automatic stabilizers
as well as openness.
5.1 Stabilization coe¢ cients and simple macro indicators
One could argue that macro measures like e.g. the tax revenue to GDP ratio reveal
su¢ cient information on the magnitude of automatic stabilizers in the di⁄erent
countries. For instance, the IMF (2009) has recently used aggregate tax to GDP
ratios as proxies for the size of automatic stabilizers in G-20 countries. The upper
panel of Figure 4 depicts the relation between the ratio of average revenue 2006-2010
to GDP and the income stabilization coe¢ cient for the proportional income shock.24
With a correlation of 0.58, one can conclude that government size is indeed a good
predictor for the amount of automatic stabilization. The picture changes, however,
if stabilization of aggregate household demand is considered, i.e. if we account for
liquidity constraints.25 As shown in Figure 4 (lower panel), with a coe¢ cient of 0.26
government size and stabilization of aggregate household demand are only weakly
correlated.26
24All ￿gures and correlations in this section are population-weighted in order to control for
di⁄erent country sizes. However, results are similar to those without population-weighting. We
also obtained similar results when using the government spending to GDP ratio instead of revenue
as a measure of the size of the government.
25In this section, we always refer to the demand stabilization coe¢ cient based on the Zeldes
criterion.
26The respective correlations for the unemployment shock are 0.69 and 0.65.
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Source: Own calculations based on EUROMOD and TAXSIM, European Commission
(2009a).
These simple correlations suggest that macro indicators like tax revenue to GDP
ratios are useful indicators for the stabilization e⁄ect of the tax and transfer system
on disposable income but can be misleading as indicators of the stabilization e⁄ect
on household demand. The reason is that the latter depends on the presence of
liquidity constraints. The income share of liquidity constrained households, however,
is negatively correlated with the size of government. In our analysis, we ￿nd a
correlation of -0.25 (see also Figure 7 in the Appendix).
Another interesting point arises from Figure 4 when making vertical comparisons
between similar countries. For instance, Denmark and Sweden, and - to some extent
- Belgium and France have similar levels of revenue to GDP ratios. However, the
stabilization is higher in Denmark and Belgium. In both countries, the importance
of the (progressive) income tax is higher, whereas Sweden and France rely more on
proportional social insurance contributions. Therefore, not only the size but also the
24structure of the tax bene￿t system are important for its possibilities of automatic
stabilization.
5.2 Automatic stabilizers and openness
It is a striking feature of our results that automatic stabilizers di⁄er signi￿cantly
within Europe. In particular, automatic stabilizers in Eastern and Southern Euro-
pean countries are much weaker than in the rest of Europe. One factor contributing
to this is that government size is often positively correlated with per capita incomes,
at least in Europe. The stabilization of disposable incomes will therefore be higher
in high income countries, just as a side e⁄ect of a larger public sector.
But di⁄erences in automatic stabilizers across countries may also have other rea-
sons. In particular, the e⁄ectiveness of demand stabilization as a way of stabilizing
domestic output is smaller, the more open the economy. In very open economies, do-
mestic output will depend heavily on export demand and higher demand by domestic
households will partly lead to higher imports. Clearly, openness of the economy has
a number of other implications for the tax and transfer system, including the view
that more open economies need more insurance against shocks as argued, e.g., by
Rodrik (1998). Figure 5 depicts the relationship between income stabilization co-
e¢ cients for the unemployment shock and openness as measured by the ratio of
exports plus imports over GDP. As graph 5 shows, it is not the case that more open
economies have weaker automatic stabilizers, the correlation is even positive (0.51).
Our results thus support the hypothesis of Rodrik (1998) that income stabilization
is higher in more open economies. For the income stabilization coe¢ cients of the
income shock and the demand stabilization coe¢ cients, we ￿nd similar correlations.
5.3 Automatic stabilizers and discretionary ￿scal policy
In the debate on ￿scal policy responses to the crisis, some countries have been
criticized for being reluctant to enact ￿scal stimulus programs in order to stabilize
demand, in particular Germany. One reaction to this criticism was to argue that
automatic stabilizers in Germany are more important than in other countries, so that
less discretionary action is required. This raises the general question of whether
countries with weaker automatic stabilizers have taken more discretionary ￿scal
policy action. To shed some light on this issue, we relate the size of ￿scal stimulus
programs as measured by the IMF (2009) to stabilization coe¢ cients.
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Graph 6 shows that income stabilization coe¢ cients (for the unemployment
shock) are largely uncorrelated to the size of ￿scal stimulus programs (-0.18). The
same holds for the income stabilization coe¢ cients of the income shock (-0.10). A
larger negative correlation emerges when we consider demand stabilization coe¢ -
cients (see Graph 8 in the Appendix). The weak correlation between automatic
stabilizers and discretionary measures quali￿es the view that countries with lower
automatic stabilizers have engaged in more discretionary ￿scal policy action (e.g.,
IMF (2009), p. 27).
A further concern in the policy debate put forward by supporters of large and
coordinated discretionary measures is that countries could limit the size of their pro-
grams at the expense of countries with more generous ￿scal policy responses. The
idea behind this argument is that some countries might show a free-rider behavior
and pro￿t from spill-over e⁄ects of discretionary measures.27 Therefore, we inves-
27In that sense, a ￿scal stimulus program can be seen as a positive externality since potential
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Average annual discretionary measures 2009-2010 Fitted values
Source: Own calculations based on EUROMOD and TAXSIM, European Commission
(2009c), IMF (2009) and International Labour O¢ ce and International Institute for
Labour Studies (2009).
tigate the hypothesis if more open countries which are supposed to bene￿t more
from spill-over e⁄ects indeed passed smaller stimulus programs. We ￿nd a negative
correlation of -0.40 between the average annual discretionary measures in 2009 and
2010 and the coe¢ cient for openness which supports the hypothesis.28
positive e⁄ects are not limited to the country of origin.
28Cf. Graph 9 in the Appendix. A multivariate regression of discretionary measures on the
income stabilization coe¢ cients, a measure of openness of the respective economies and their
governments￿budget balance in 2007 leads to signi￿cant coe¢ cients of openness and the budget
balance; whereas the relationship between discretionary ￿scal policy and the amount of automatic
stabilization remains insigni￿cant. This result indicates that in addition to the argument above
about openness, some governments have been constrained by weak budget positions in their decision
making about discretionary ￿scal policy. However, due to the very small sample size, this inference
should be interpreted with caution.
276 Conclusions
In this paper we have used microsimulation models for the tax and transfer sys-
tems of 19 European countries (EUROMOD) and the US (TAXSIM) to investigate
the extent to which automatic stabilizers cushion household disposable income and
household demand in the event of macroeconomic shocks. Our baseline simulations
focus on the personal income tax, employee social insurance contributions and ben-
e￿ts. We ￿nd that the amount of automatic stabilization depends strongly on the
type of income shock. In the case of a proportional income shock, approximately
38% of the shock would be absorbed by automatic stabilizers in the EU. For the
US, we ￿nd a value of 32%. Within the EU, there is considerable heterogeneity,
and results range from a value of 25% for Estonia to 56% for Denmark. In general
automatic stabilizers in Eastern and Southern European countries are considerably
lower than in Continental and Northern European countries.
In the case of an unemployment shock, which a⁄ects households asymmetrically,
the di⁄erence between the EU and the US is larger. EU automatic stabilizers absorb
47% of the shock whereas the stabilization e⁄ect in the US is only 34%. Again,
there is considerable heterogeneity within the EU. This result implies that European
welfare states provide higher insurance against idiosyncratic shocks than the US
does. In addition, our analysis shows that the results for the proportional income
shock do not di⁄er much to a proportional income increase (results available from
the authors upon request). Hence, the di⁄erence between the income shock and
the unemployment shock can also be interpreted as the di⁄erent size of automatic
stabilization in good and bad times.
These results suggest that social transfers, in particular the rather generous sys-
tems of unemployment insurance in Europe, play a key role for the stabilization of
disposable incomes and household demand and explain a large part of the di⁄erence
in automatic stabilizers between Europe and the US. This is con￿rmed by the de-
composition of stabilization e⁄ects in our analysis. In the case of the unemployment
shocks, bene￿ts alone absorb 19% of the shock in Europe compared to just 7% in the
US, whereas the stabilizing e⁄ect of income taxes (taking into account State taxes
in the US as well) is similar. To some extent, this quali￿es the view that automatic
stabilizers are larger in Europe than in the US. This is only true for countries like
Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Germany or Sweden.
How does this cushioning of shocks translate into demand stabilization? Since
28demand stabilization can only be achieved for liquidity constrained households, the
picture changes signi￿cantly. For the proportional income shock, the cushioning
e⁄ect of automatic stabilizers ranges from 4-22% in the EU. For the US, we ￿nd
values between 6-17%, which is again rather similar. The values for the Euro area
are close to those for the EU. For the unemployment shock, however, we ￿nd a large
di⁄erence. In the EU, the stabilization e⁄ect ranges from 13-30% whereas the values
for the US (7-20%) are close to those for the income shock.
A second key result of our analysis is that demand stabilization di⁄ers consider-
ably from disposable income stabilization. This has important policy implications,
also for discretionary ￿scal policy. Focusing on income stabilization may lead poli-
cymakers to overestimate the e⁄ect of automatic stabilizers.
A third important result of our analysis is that automatic stabilizers are very
heterogenous within Europe. Interestingly, Eastern and Southern European coun-
tries are characterized by rather low automatic stabilizers. This is surprising, at
least from an insurance point of view because lower average income (and wealth)
implies that households are more vulnerable to income shocks. One explanation
for this ￿nding could be that countries with lower per capita incomes tend to have
smaller public sectors. From this perspective, weaker automatic stabilizers in East-
ern and Southern European countries are a potentially unintended side e⁄ect of the
lower demand for government activity including redistribution. Another potential
explanation, the idea that more open economies have weaker automatic stabilizers
because domestic demand spills over to other countries, seems to be inconsistent with
the data, at least as far as the simple correlation between stabilization coe¢ cients
and trade to GDP ratios is concerned.
Finally, we have discussed the claim that countries with smaller automatic sta-
bilizers have engaged in more discretionary ￿scal policy action. According to our
results, there is no correlation between ￿scal stimulus programs of individual coun-
tries and stabilization coe¢ cients. However, we ￿nd that more open countries and
countries with higher budget de￿cits have passed smaller stimulus programs. All
in all, our results suggest that policymakers did not take into account the forces
of automatic stabilizers when designing active ￿scal policy measures to tackle the
current economic crisis.
These results have to be interpreted in the light of various limitations of our
analysis. Firstly, the role of tax and transfer systems for stabilizing household
demand, not just disposable income, is based on strong assumptions on the link
29between disposable income and household expenditures. Although we have used
what we believe to be the best available methods for estimating liquidity constraints,
considerable uncertainty remains as to whether these methods lead to an appropriate
description of household behavior. Secondly, our analysis abstracts from automatic
stabilization through other taxes, in particular corporate income taxes. Thirdly, our
analysis is purely positive. We abstract from normative welfare considerations about
the optimal size of automatic stabilization. Taxes are distortionary and hence imply
a trade-o⁄ between insurance against shocks through redistribution and e¢ ciency
considerations. Finally, we have abstracted from the role of labor supply or other
behavioral adjustments for the impact of automatic stabilizers. We intend to pursue
these issues in future research.
30A Appendix:
A.1 Additional results
Table 2: Decomposition income stabilization coe¢ cient for income shock
FEDTax StateTax SIC BEN Total
AT 0.294 0.000 0.139 0.006 0.439
BE 0.382 0.000 0.131 0.014 0.527
DK 0.455 0.000 0.086 0.018 0.558
EE 0.228 0.000 0.021 0.004 0.253
FI 0.340 0.000 0.050 0.006 0.396
FR 0.153 0.000 0.181 0.036 0.370
GE 0.351 0.000 0.118 0.012 0.481
GR 0.203 0.000 0.088 0.000 0.291
HU 0.307 0.000 0.160 0.009 0.476
IR 0.310 0.000 0.039 0.014 0.363
IT 0.254 0.000 0.079 0.013 0.346
LU 0.265 0.000 0.097 0.012 0.374
NL 0.270 0.000 0.116 0.011 0.397
PL 0.168 0.000 0.118 0.015 0.301
PT 0.203 0.000 0.090 0.010 0.303
SI 0.289 0.000 0.031 0.028 0.317
SP 0.240 0.000 0.035 0.001 0.277
SW 0.368 0.000 0.040 0.012 0.420
UK 0.267 0.000 0.054 0.031 0.352
EU 0.260 0.000 0.100 0.017 0.378
EURO 0.263 0.000 0.108 0.015 0.385
USA 0.240 0.049 0.039 -0.006 0.322
Source: Own calculations based on EUROMOD and TAXSIM
31Table 3: Decomposition income stabilization coe¢ cient for unemployment shock
FEDTax StateTax SIC BEN Total
AT 0.163 0.000 0.171 0.252 0.585
BE 0.240 0.000 0.123 0.249 0.612
DK 0.116 0.000 0.092 0.615 0.823
EE 0.173 0.000 0.023 0.036 0.233
FI 0.221 0.000 0.049 0.248 0.519
FR 0.075 0.000 0.190 0.303 0.568
GE 0.209 0.000 0.145 0.269 0.624
GR 0.093 0.000 0.150 0.079 0.322
HU 0.203 0.000 0.191 0.073 0.467
IR 0.178 0.000 0.036 0.173 0.387
IT 0.164 0.000 0.105 0.042 0.311
LU 0.127 0.000 0.080 0.387 0.593
NL 0.104 0.000 0.171 0.178 0.452
PL 0.134 0.000 0.166 0.030 0.329
PT 0.146 0.000 0.097 0.143 0.386
SI 0.152 0.000 0.221 0.073 0.431
SP 0.124 0.000 0.068 0.184 0.376
SW 0.199 0.000 0.027 0.452 0.678
UK 0.191 0.000 0.061 0.163 0.415
EU 0.156 0.000 0.124 0.188 0.469
EURO 0.150 0.000 0.133 0.202 0.485
USA 0.174 0.041 0.051 0.071 0.337
Source: Own calculations based on EUROMOD and TAXSIM
32Table 4: Shares of liquidity constrained households
Population share Income share
Wealth Home Survey Wealth Home Survey
AT 0.844 0.481 0.302 0.827 0.401 0.088
BE 0.702 0.297 0.228 0.633 0.177 0.039
DK 0.581 0.432 0.218 0.516 0.238 0.039
EE 0.975 0.158 0.264 0.955 0.121 0.028
FI 0.696 0.356 0.334 0.585 0.235 0.089
FR 0.365 0.452 0.340 0.296 0.374 0.120
GE 0.328 0.593 0.392 0.287 0.494 0.159
GR 0.845 0.260 0.318 0.808 0.282 0.053
HU 0.973 0.073 0.620 0.958 0.073 0.282
IR 0.663 0.176 0.396 0.538 0.102 0.091
IT 0.762 0.235 0.330 0.733 0.191 0.076
LU 0.708 0.307 0.210 0.692 0.309 0.066
NL 0.637 0.451 0.240 0.570 0.247 0.058
PL 0.985 0.463 0.560 0.982 0.434 0.192
PT 0.861 0.334 0.215 0.800 0.261 0.023
SI 0.661 0.103 0.440 0.522 0.080 0.108
SP 0.709 0.180 0.306 0.681 0.151 0.066
SW 0.528 0.674 0.201 0.472 0.752 0.062
UK 0.793 0.320 0.263 0.735 0.164 0.062
EU 0.641 0.383 0.346 0.596 0.305 0.106
EURO 0.561 0.387 0.333 0.513 0.313 0.101
USA 0.743 0.369 0.269 0.486 0.173 0.168
Source: Own calculations based on EUROMOD and TAXSIM. Notes: The ￿rst approach
for the identi￿cation of liquidity constraints refers to the ￿nancial wealth criterion
(Zeldes), the second to the real estate property criterion (Runkle) and the third refers to
survey evidence.
33Table 5: Decomposition income stabilization coe¢ cient including employer SIC
￿TaxIS ￿SICIS ￿BenIS ￿TBIS ￿TaxUS ￿SICUS ￿BenUS ￿TBUS
AT 0.253 0.258 0.006 0.517 0.136 0.304 0.211 0.652
BE 0.317 0.278 0.012 0.607 0.200 0.272 0.207 0.678
DK 0.447 0.101 0.017 0.566 0.115 0.103 0.607 0.826
EE 0.174 0.257 0.003 0.433 0.128 0.276 0.027 0.431
FI 0.281 0.215 0.005 0.501 0.181 0.221 0.203 0.606
FR 0.092 0.508 0.022 0.622 0.047 0.498 0.188 0.732
GE 0.314 0.211 0.010 0.535 0.182 0.254 0.235 0.672
GR 0.187 0.157 0.000 0.345 0.084 0.235 0.071 0.390
HU 0.243 0.335 0.007 0.585 0.160 0.361 0.058 0.579
IR 0.295 0.087 0.013 0.395 0.171 0.077 0.165 0.413
IT 0.210 0.238 0.011 0.458 0.132 0.280 0.034 0.446
LU 0.243 0.173 0.011 0.427 0.118 0.144 0.360 0.622
NL 0.267 0.124 0.011 0.402 0.093 0.255 0.160 0.508
PL 0.148 0.223 0.013 0.384 0.115 0.283 0.025 0.423
PT 0.170 0.239 0.009 0.417 0.124 0.232 0.122 0.478
SI 0.287 0.038 0.028 0.321 0.133 0.319 0.064 0.503
SP 0.205 0.175 0.001 0.382 0.099 0.256 0.147 0.502
SW 0.286 0.254 0.010 0.549 0.152 0.258 0.345 0.754
UK 0.246 0.128 0.029 0.403 0.179 0.122 0.152 0.453
EU 0.223 0.241 0.014 0.478 0.132 0.275 0.153 0.560
EURO 0.222 0.265 0.011 0.497 0.123 0.305 0.158 0.587
USA 0.289 0.077 -0.006 0.360 0.215 0.102 0.071 0.388
Source: Own calculations based on EUROMOD and TAXSIM
34Table 6: Demand stabilization coe¢ cient including consumption taxes
￿CT
1 IS ￿C incl:CT
1 IS ￿CT
1 US ￿C incl:CT
1 US
AT 0.103 0.466 0.072 0.570
BE 0.061 0.406 0.043 0.485
DK 0.077 0.363 0.008 0.601
EE 0.158 0.400 0.160 0.386
FI 0.095 0.344 0.069 0.421
FR 0.037 0.152 0.007 0.266
GE 0.027 0.169 0.005 0.257
GR 0.090 0.319 0.083 0.346
HU 0.133 0.588 0.135 0.583
IR 0.083 0.268 0.072 0.315
IT 0.078 0.360 0.099 0.332
LU 0.104 0.360 0.070 0.510
NL 0.083 0.310 0.073 0.361
PL 0.134 0.430 0.129 0.453
PT 0.111 0.351 0.089 0.401
SI 0.041 0.131 0.062 0.289
SP 0.078 0.262 0.068 0.333
SW 0.072 0.273 0.014 0.424
UK 0.090 0.353 0.084 0.434
EU 0.072 0.293 0.060 0.357
EURO 0.059 0.253 0.046 0.316
USA 0.020 0.194 0.025 0.222































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.3 .35 .4 .45 .5 .55 .6
Average annual revenue 2007-2010 to GDP
Share of income liquidity constrained households Fitted values
Source: Own calculations based on EUROMOD and TAXSIM, European Commission
(2009a).
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Demand stabilization coefficient
Average annual discretionary measures 2009-2010 Fitted values
Source: Own calculations based on EUROMOD and TAXSIM, European Commission
(2009c), IMF (2009).










































































.2 .7 1.2 1.7 2.2 2.7
Average ratio of exports and imports to GDP, 2000-2004
Average annual discretionary measures 2009-2010 Fitted values
Source: Heston et al. (2006), European Commission (2009c), International Labour O¢ ce
and International Institute for Labour Studies (2009) and IMF (2009).
38A.2 Reweighting procedure for increasing unemployment
In order to increase the unemployment rate while keeping the aggregate counts of
other key individual and household characteristics constant, we follow the approach
taken by Immvervoll et al. (2006). The increase of the unemployment rates is mod-
eled through reweighting of our samples while controlling for several individual and
household characteristics that determine the risk of becoming unemployed.
We follow Immvervoll et al. (2006) and de￿ne the unemployed as people aged
19￿ 59 declaring themselves to be out of work and looking for a job. The within-
database national ￿ unemployment rate￿is calculated as the ratio of these unemployed
to those in the labor force, de￿ned as the unemployed plus people aged 19￿ 59 who
are (self)employed. The increased total number of unemployed people is calculated
such that total household income decreases by 5% within each country.
In EUROMOD, the baseline household weights supplied with the national data-
bases have been calculated to adjust for sample design and/or di⁄erential non-
response (see Sutherland (2001) for details). Weights are then recalculated using the
existing weights as a starting point, but (a) using the increased (decreased) num-
ber of unemployed (employed) people as the control totals for them, and (b) also
controlling for individual demographic and household composition variables using
the existing grossed-up totals for these categories as control totals. The speci￿c
variables used as controls are:
￿ employment status
￿ age (0￿ 18, 19￿ 24, 25￿ 49, 50￿ 59, 60+)
￿ gender
￿ marital status and household size
￿ education
￿ region
This method implies that the households without any unemployed people that
are similar to households with unemployed people (according to the above variables)
will have their weights reduced. In other words, these are the households who are
￿ made unemployed￿in our exercise.
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